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The family is a powerful instrument of governmentality in the
Foucaultian sense.
It disciplines interpersonal, sexual, and
intergenerational relationships, and in so doing it structures definite
relations of power between genders and construes social identities which
affect not only individuals and groups but also national communities. Of
course, the law plays a critical role within this framework, substantially
contributing to the construction of the family as a governmental dispositif.
It operates primarily as such in the law of the family as an intellectual
enterprise, namely in the way lawyers create family law as an autonomous
body of law, ambiguously situated in an area that is neither entirely private
nor entirely public. Therefore, family law is exceptional but also peripheral
to the heart of the law, conceived as the object of legal science.
In fact, the legal regulation of domestic relations as a separate legal field,
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both marginal and exceptional to the law of the market, is a relatively
recent jural creation. It is the product of the legal consciousness
dominating in the era of Classical Legal Thought (CLT), which
characterizes the Western legal systems from the second half of the
nineteenth century through the beginning of the twentieth century.1 CLT
grounds the exceptionalism of family law in a complex set of legal
arguments, including a different paradigm, proper legal techniques, and an
autonomous justification for the legitimacy of state regulation in this field.
Thus solidarity, altruism, and communitarian motives rule the family,
whereas the core of private law, the law of the market, is ruled by the
paradigm of individualism. Then different legal forms and techniques are
deployed: a hierarchical order for the family, instead of the principle of
formal equality between individuals, interpersonal relationships defined by
status rather than by contract, the authority of the state rather than the free
will of private parties, reciprocal duties (of the spouses) which are not
obligations from a technical point of view, and the doctrine of interspousal
immunity in place of the general principle of tort liability. The legitimacy
of state regulation of the family is alternatively denied and affirmed: denied
because the family, as a pre-legal entity, the natural site of love, caring, and
affection, does not tolerate the state’s intrusions, and affirmed as necessary,
because of the crucial role of the family in the foundation of the social
order. As to the core of the private domain—the market—the legitimacy of
state intervention is, on the contrary, restricted to the recognition of the
power of free will, within the framework of a rigid public/private divide.
Beyond that primary recognition, any other intervention of the state has to
be understood as exceptional.

1. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought:1850-2000,
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 20
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) [hereinafter Globalizations].
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Chart 1
Core private law

Family law

Individualism
***
Formal equality
Contract
Free Will
Voluntary obligations
Tort Liability
***
Exceptionality of State
Intervention

Solidarity
***
Hierarchy
Status
State Will
Duties
Immunity
***
Necessity/Undesirability of State
Intervention

The power of persuasion of this picture, in its basic traits, lasts over time
beyond the era of CLT.
The pattern of marginality and exceptionalism along which family law is
constructed still operates in the mentality of contemporary mainstream
jurists. It prevails in the way in which family law is dealt with as a subject
of legal analysis within domestic contexts, but also in other scenarios: in
the investigation of the dynamics of legal diffusion regarding family law as
a distinct field of comparative law, and on the terrain of the harmonization
of private law in Europe. Legal diffusion is the phenomenon according to
which legal rules and concepts travel beyond national borders, from one
legal system to another for a variety of reasons, such as the prestige of the
legal artifact imported (e.g., the Code Napoleon), the political influence
that one country exerts over another, or the cultural appeal of the legal
system the transplant comes from. By the harmonization of private law in
Europe, I mean the process that leads progressively towards the uniformity
of the legal rules enacted in the different EU Member States.
This Article aims to offer an appraisal of family law exceptionalism as a
main feature of the governmental power of the family in the perspective of
legal diffusion. It moves from the belief that the pattern of marginality and
exceptionalism I have briefly described is functional to legitimize the
family as the site of unequal distribution of power, wealth, and labor
between genders, according to a scheme perfectly sketched out in the
feminist analysis of the production/reproduction dichotomy.
In my view, the effort to de-marginalize family law is also the main
route to enable the search for fairer compromises between women and men
as well as between children and parents within the institution of the family.
This effort can be traced back to the critical and legal realist tradition that

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

3

MARELLA 1/24/11

4/7/2011 2:29:32 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 9

724

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:2

challenges the core/periphery dichotomy as the basis of family law
exceptionalism. In the past decade, I have been part of a network of
theorists who have started from that tradition to promote and develop a new
discourse on family law as a cultural artifact and an instrument of
governance at the national, global and transnational level. This Article is
about that intellectual experience. It offers a discussion of family law as a
term of the core/periphery opposition in two different senses. On the one
hand, I refer to the core and the periphery of the law, where the core is
represented by the law of the market, namely the law of obligations, while
the legal regime of the family is confined to the margins of it. On the other
hand, a geopolitical understanding of the divide comes into view: here the
core of legal diffusion is commonly considered the Western legal
tradition—the Empire, in other words—whereas the periphery is
represented by the colonial importer of legal thought.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I investigates the way in which
the classical divide between the (supposed) core of private law (consisting
of the legal structures of the market: contract, property, and torts) and the
(supposed) periphery of the system, represented by family law, reproduces
itself in the field of comparative law.2 Core and periphery are associated
with different modes of legal diffusion: while in the field of contract,
property, and tort, transplants from one legal system to another are
described as autonomous from social and political conditions, in the sphere
of the family, changes are grounded on political factors and social values.
This oppositional approach affects the way in which family law has been
tackled thus far as a viable field of comparative law. In Part I, I map and
criticize the dominant methods operating in the comparative analysis of
family legal topics as patterns of family law exceptionalism. By contrast, I
suggest a genealogy of deconstructive approaches to comparative family
law as a way out from marginalization.
Part II of the article discusses the dynamics between the core/periphery
of law and the core/periphery of the world.3 It challenges the hierarchical
order inherent in both of these dichotomies at two different levels. On the
first level, the family plays a key role in constructing legal traditions.4
Here the opposition between the core and the periphery of law is framed in
the context of the formation of postcolonial states, where the core/periphery
divide between the family and the market intersects the geopolitical
opposition between the core and the periphery of the world under the guise
of a conflict between modernity and tradition. Here, I draw in the idea,
well settled in comparative law, that the core of the world is identified with
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part II.
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the Western Legal Tradition (WLT), housing and harmonizing common
law and civil law.5 In this framework, convergences between the common
law and the civil law traditions are stressed, while divergences among them
are downplayed. Common traits, such as the rule of law and the
establishment of a jural elite of professionals, are identified as common
roots of a common WLT. In this body of comparative law thinking, the
WLT mainly overlaps with modernity in stark contrast with tradition,
which is commonly represented by local, “traditional” law. The WLT as
defined above is clearly a centric construction which marginalizes other
legal systems. Part II of the Article shows that the national/traditional
character of family law is not nearly as constitutive as it is commonly
presented and that, along with the single geopolitical context, it has been
either strategically emphasized as the epitome of the local Tradition, or
downplayed in favor of a rapid modernization of the system. This part of
the paper demonstrates that family law is either deployed in favor of the
construction of a legal tradition as an original product or set aside in order
to emphasize similarities between the local legal system and a foreign
dominant legal culture.
The second level is the level of globalization.6 According to the
prevailing narrative (the “glocal” narrative), in the globalized world the
core of private law, contract law, spreads from the core towards the
periphery of the planet, whereas the periphery of law, family law, remains
inexorably local.7 However, an opposite progression—from the periphery
to the center—may also occur. In fact, sometimes, the periphery of law—
family law—as created and enforced at the periphery of the world moves to
the center and is capable of influencing it, as in the case of the Muslim
legal institution of the Kafalah, a form of custody over minors, which has
made its way through the legal systems of several European states.8 On the
other hand, this pattern is sometimes subverted, as in the case of the EU
Directive on Family Reunification, where Europe, at the core of the
Western Legal Tradition, rejects conjugal unions other than monogamy and
pushes back to the periphery of the world its peripheral law.9 Here I
suggest an explanation for the prevalence of one dynamic over the other
5. On the concept of Western Legal Tradition, see FORMATION OF CONTRACTS
(Rudolph Schlesinger ed., 1968); GINO GORLA, IL CONTRATTO (1955); ANTONIO
GAMBARO & RODOLFO SACCO, SISTEMI GIURIDICI COMPARATI (3d ed. 2008).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See generally Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1057 (1980) (arguing that the current legal framework deprives metropolitan areas of
the ability to create solutions to local problems).
8. See INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE CENTER FOR THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
DEPRIVED OF THEIR FAMILY, http://www.iss-ssi.org (last visited July 19, 2010).
9. See Council Directive 2003/86, On the Right to Family Reunification, 2001
O.J. (L 251) 12 (EC).
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and vice versa.
In Part III, I critically analyze the current methods of the European
harmonization process for reproducing and enforcing the core/periphery
divide.10 I conclude that the harmonization of both the law of the market
and the law of the family, as well as the currently dominant approaches in
the harmonization process—the common core approach and the “better
law” approach—should be submitted to the deconstructive scrutiny of
comparative law as both a method of analysis of legal diffusion and a
powerful instrument of internal critique.
I. THE SCIENTIFIC CONTEXT: THE CORE/PERIPHERY DIVIDE IN THE
FRAMEWORK OF COMPARATIVE LAW
The distinction between family law (assumed to be the periphery of
private law) and the legal structures of the market (representing the core of
private law) is generally understood as one of the profound structures of
legal science since the mid-nineteenth century.11
As such, family law and the core of private law undergo different modes
of legal diffusion, shaped, on the side of the family, by the main traits of its
exceptionalism a (policy-oriented essence, which makes family law local
and contingent), whereas the law of the market claims to be universalistic.
Here is how comparative lawyers, following Rodolfo Sacco and Alan
Watson, among others, construct this large distinction:
Chart 2
Core private law
Technicalities and legal science
↓
Universalism
Continuity (cryptotypes)
Historical
approach
and/or
Structuralism
Irrelevance of sociology
Prestige

Family Law
Political motives
↓
Localism
Discontinuity
Functionalism
Sociology
Better law

As the chart above shows, family law exceptionalism is connected to and
justified by a variety of features. First of all, the political character of
10. See infra Part III.
11. Duncan Kennedy, Savigny’s Family/Patrimony Distinction and its Place in the

Global Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 811 (2010)
[hereinafter Savigny].
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family law, its contiguity to morals and religious beliefs and the subsequent
lack of those jural technicalities which, on the contrary, make the law of the
market the elective site of legal science. The asserted influence of political
motives, moral attitudes, and traditional customs over the legal regime of
the family makes it inevitably local, and localism juxtaposes family law to
the law of obligations and its universalistic aspiration. The sociological
approach emerges at this point as the most appropriate methodology to
investigate family law issues, whereas legal science analyzes contract law
and the law of obligations on the basis of its own disciplinary paradigm.
This set of ideas grounds a sort of skepticism towards the feasibility of the
comparative analysis of family law. On the other hand, it prepares to
explain the phenomenon of family law’s diffusion according to dynamics
which are assumed as distinctive to this legal field.
In the chart above, I present discontinuity as characteristic of both
development and diffusion of family law, functionalism as the (supposed)
most appropriate method in comparing family law regimes, and the socalled better law approach as the leading technique applied in specific
processes of legal diffusion/engineering such as the harmonization of law
(in EU, for instance). In my view all these features are outcomes of the
exceptionalism of family law; it is not by chance, therefore, that they are
specular and opposed to the main characters of the diffusion of the core
private law.
Rodolfo Sacco12 and Alan Watson13—founding fathers of the most
successful and largely converging theories on legal diffusion—construe the
diffusion of the core of law, private law, on a legal science paradigm.
Unlike the dominant representations of family law’s nature and circulation,
their interpretations of the core private law’s diffusion rely on the relative
autonomy of legal change from economic, social, and political conditions.
Legal change occurs as a product of interplay of continuity and legal
transplants, they claim. The split between society and law which both
theories produce leads to the conclusion that a rule or a body of rules does
not necessarily circulate on a rational ground. The evolution of law has its
own reasons and follows its own paths.14 Prestige or authority of the
model, not (necessarily) its compatibility with the new legal system and its
socio-economic background, is the justification of a legal transplant. For
instance, there are neither important economic or political similarities nor a
12. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law
(Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 10 (1991) [hereinafter Installment I].
13. Alan Watson, From Legal Transplants to Legal Formants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L.
469, 469 (1995).
14. See Pier Guiseppe Monateri, The “Weak Law”: Contaminations and Legal
Cultures, in ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE XVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 83 (1998).
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common legal tradition between France in the late XVIII century and Egypt
at the beginning of the twentieth century, yet Sanhuri adopted the model of
the Code Napoleon for the Egyptian Civil Code. The same can be
observed in the borrowing of the Buergerliches Gesetzbuch, the German
Civil Code, in Japan at the end of the XIX century.
According to Sacco and Watson, the historical approach is the starting
point in analyzing the matrix of legal diffusion, but it is not sufficient to the
foundation of these complex theories, structuralist thought has widely
contributed. In fact, both Sacco and Watson recall in their analysis the
structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure: law develops not unlike language,
according to inherent dynamics which are due to the adaption of its own
structures and are therefore detached from social conditions or political
directives.15 In the words of Sacco, “Along with law . . . language provides
a typical example of a cultural phenomenon in continuous evolution but the
evolution of language is not connected to a class or an axiological or moral
choice.”16 Hence, the comparative lawyer, like the linguist, is entitled to
discover the causes of this evolution inside the law itself, by exploring its
inner structures and dynamics. The similarity between law and language
had already been displayed by Karl Friedrich von Savigny, the founder of
historical jurisprudence. In his eminent work Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für
Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft17 (On the Vocation of our Age for
Legislation and Jurisprudence), Savigny claimed that law is the issue of the
Volksgeist, the collective genius; like language or manners, it is organically
connected to a people and cannot be conceived as the product of the
arbitrary will of a lawgiver. Therefore law, and especially private law,
which is his main object of interest, is a complex body of rules formed
from a spontaneous tradition. Within this genealogy, it is Friedrich von
Hayek, infamous theorist of liberalism, who gave to the law/language
resemblance an anti-social turn, by insisting on the autonomy of private
law from politics and social developments. Just like Savigny, Hayek
maintained that both language and law are not the products of an
intentional project, but, unlike Savigny, he stresses the detachment of
private law from politics and society. Hayek claimed that private law
governs relationships within the society according to an almost accidental
order.18 Neither linguistic nor legal developments can be wholly planned
15. See generally FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS
(1972).
16. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law
(Installment II of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 393 (1991) [hereinafter Installment II].
17. KARL FRIEDRICH VON SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSERER ZEIT FÜR
GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (Hildesheim 1967).
18. See F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE
LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL
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or ordered; rather, they order social connections.19 Consequently, extensive
projects of legal change cannot succeed. This is very close to what Sacco
and Watson think about law reforms. In Sacco’s theory of legal diffusion
this is explained with the operation of cryptotypes, elements hidden in legal
systems that can prevent transplants from being accepted. Specifically,
cryptotypes are rules or doctrines in force before a legal reform and then
superseded, which survive in a non-verbalized form in the mentality of
judges and scholars and influence their interpretation of the new law with
the result of obscuring or neutralizing the goal pursued by the reform itself.
As an example, Sacco takes the preservation by French courts of the
requirement of delivery to transfer ownership despite the Code Napoleon
which does not include delivery among the requirements necessary for
ownership to be transferred: “The cryptotype that has influenced the French
jurists is the solution that prevailed in Roman law,”20 but it doesn’t come
out as such in outward explanations. Most of these elements—from
universalism to continuity, from structuralism to prestige, etc.—are usually
held as strangers to the diffusion of family law. Most significant law
reforms that occurred in the twentieth century within the Western Legal
Tradition were grounded on political and social changes and aimed at
fulfilling projects of modernization. No-fault divorce, equality of children
born out of wedlock, and equality between spouses are often outcomes of
the democratic constitutions enacted after the Second World War or strictly
tied to the advent of the welfare state. The evolution of family law is the
outcome of legal transplants which find their legitimacy in stereotypes like
modernity, progressivism, etc. In other words, it is a product of
functionalist projects and of discontinuity: a foreign model is appealing as
long as it is the landmark of a new conception of family relations, which is
functional to modernize the whole society and is therefore perceived as a
factor of discontinuity with respect to the previous regime. In the words of
Sacco: “family law is nowadays very similar among all legal systems in the
WLT as a result of strong social urges;”21 on the contrary, the core of
private law is characterized by the strong technicalities of legal texts and
science that may vary from country to country, and by subtle and capillary
distinctions which are the product of a bi-millenary legal evolution.
In short, in the field of family law, phenomena of convergence among
legal systems are mostly seen as the diffusion and inoculation of values and
JUSTICE 67 (1973). These ideas are already developed in F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM (Routledge 1976) (1944).
19. See Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Cunning Passages: Comparazione e Ideologia nei
Rapport tra Diritto e Linguaggio, in RIVISTA CRITICA DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO 353 (1999)
(outlining the political implications of this theory).
20. Sacco, Installment II, supra note 16, at 391.
21. See RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATOR 160 (1992).
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principles, rather than as transplants of technical rules, such as the mailbox
rule in the formation of contracts or the delivery requirement in property
transfers.22 This may help to clarify further the last opposition I have
sketched in the chart above: while legal borrowings at the core of law are
mostly due to the prestige of the model imported, principally assessed in
scientific terms, legal change in family law often relies on the “better law”
criterion, i.e. on the choice of the foreign law which is deemed better to
modernize the domestic legal regime of the family. We will see this
criterion at work in the last part of this paper.
In this subsection I show, first, how the core/periphery opposition
incorporates the market/family opposition (Part 1.A), and then I show how
this opposition has been deconstructed (Part 1.B).
A. Constructing the Core/Periphery Divide
As a result of these basic constructs of comparative law, family law is
not only marginalized by and/or from legal science at the national level but
also rendered peripheral as a subject of comparative law analysis. As long
as comparative law relies on a scientific paradigm, there is no scientific
way to compare family legal regimes, which appear inescapably local,
sociological, and anthropological, hence the so-far limited interest of
comparative law scholars for family related issues.
The marginality of family law as a scientific subject was not even
overcome in the era of Functionalism (from the 1950s onward). According
to the methodological approach which has been dominant for decades in
comparative law and is known as Social Purpose Functionalism,
comparative law works on facts and solutions. In every legal system, law
faces the same problems and, through different conceptualizations, comes
to a solution.23 Because problems—the underlying social facts and social
purposes—are similar, solutions are almost by definition comparable.
Therefore, the comparativist moves from facts to solutions, which in his
view are functional equivalents.
However, history, mores, and ethics—all associated with family law—
heavily interfere with and eventually disrupt the objectivity of the
functionalist method. As a result, most comparative law scholars have left
family law on one side; because there are no functional equivalents that
jurists can compare scientifically, comparative law scholars cannot
compare family laws.24 In the end, functionalism thus maintains the
22. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism and the Concept of Equality, in
DEMOCRACY, DIFFERENCE & SOCIAL JUSTICE 310 (Gurpreet Mahajan ed., 1998).
23. On this issue see Fernanda G. Nicola, Family Law Exceptionalism in
Comparative Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 777 (2010).
24. See Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L.
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exceptionality of family law, consequently reinforcing the core/periphery
divide within private law.
However, even those few authors who do not follow the functionalist
approach in producing comparative analysis of family law related issues do
not seem interested in bridging the “scientific” gap between family law and
the core of private law. Professor Mary Ann Glendon, certainly one of the
most renowned family law scholars in the international academia, applies a
text-and-context methodology in analyzing the transformation of family
law in the United States and Western Europe.25 She speaks about
borrowings and context, and in so doing she stresses the bi-directional
interplay of law and society, according to which legal change is engendered
by social instances of transformation and also affects the way in which
people imagine and project their family relations. Nevertheless, she depicts
the family as a legal field as exceptional, for “families . . . give rise to
tension between love and duty, reason and passion, immediate and longrange objectives, egoism, and altruism,”26 and context eventually prevails
on legal borrowings in defining the actual legal regime of the family in a
given country.
Family law’s exceptionalism is not even challenged by the more
sophisticated approaches to comparative law. For instance, a prominent
representative of the Sacco School, Professor Silvia Ferreri,27 discussing
the influence of foreign legislation on the Italian family law reform of
1975, concludes that the convergence of family law regimes that occurred
in the past decades all over the West and beyond is due to a widespread
changes in social habits and material conditions of life rather than to the
scientific prestige of any legal model.
Another European scholar, Harry Willekens, opposes an elaborated
version of the functionalist method to the dominant approach focused on
the ideological factor and to René David’s explanation of legal diffusion
through families of law.28 David’s classification comprises the RomanoGermanic family of law, characterized by the unifying effect of the
codifications, the Common Law family, which revolves around the binding
force of judicial decisions, the Socialist family of law, where the law is
deeply affected by the power of the political party, and a residual group,
REV. 1, 13 (1974).
25. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 291 (1989).
26. See id. at 313.
27. Silvia Ferreri, Retorica e Sostanza: Leggi Straniere sul Regime Patrimoniale
Della Famiglia, in 2 FAMILIA (2009).
28. H. Willekens, Explaining Two Hundred Years of Family Law in Western
Europe, in HET GEZINSCRECHT IN DE SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN 59 (H. Willekens ed.,
1997).
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formed by Muslim Law, Hindu Law, African Law, Extreme East Law.29
According to Willekens, David’s scheme only has a descriptive value,
since it highlights the use of the same legal methods and concepts among
the systems forming one family of law, but it is incapable of explaining
differences in the content of family laws.30 This way he resists, on the one
hand, a representation of family law’s political insights as merely
contingent and, on the other, David’s scientific approach, which justifies
similarities and differences among legal systems on a “neutral” basis, that
is on their being member of a legal family (the Romano-Germanic family,
the Common Law family, and so on) or of another. As to the accounts of
family law evolution based on ideology, Willekens deems them trivial or
false. According to this author, the ideological approach can escape
triviality only insofar there is a causal distance between the norms and the
ideology invoked to explain them. While this causal connection clearly
links the liberalization of divorce and the widespread opinion that divorce
should be easier, there is no such relationship between liberalization of
divorce and liberal ideology. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that a
liberalization of divorce took place in the Scandinavian countries, where
liberalism has been strongly limited by a State-driven welfare system.31 On
the contrary, Willekens explains the transformation and diffusion of family
law over the last two centuries by showing the interconnections between
family legal regimes and economic dynamics as well as the
interconnections between the structures of the family and given social
policies inherent to the politics of the welfare state. In this way he does not
resist family law’s exceptionalism, but rather he justifies it on an
articulated basis which emphasizes the complementary character of the
family in relation to the development of capitalism in Western European
countries.
To sum up: none of these comparative analyses contains a refutation of
the claim that family law is peripheral to the law of the market.
This suggests that the purpose of de-marginalizing family law has to be
pursued by challenging the core/periphery divide and the assumptions
underlying the theories on legal diffusion that strengthen it. The seminal
works of some scholars enable a critical understanding of family law and
the possibility of a valuable comparative analysis in this field.
B. Deconstructing the Core/Periphery Divide
On the side of comparative law, Professor Pier Giuseppe Monateri,
29. RENÉ DAVID, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARÉ: INTRODUCTION
À L’ÉTUDE DES DROITS ÉTRANGERS ET À LA MÉTHODE COMPARATIVE (1950).
30. Willekens, supra note 28, at 75.
31. Id. at 77.
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another prominent member of Sacco’s School, arguing from a critical
perspective, challenges the law/society split devised by masters of
comparative law such as Sacco and Watson. He stresses the importance of
social, political, and economic needs, which underpin the very same legal
borrowings that Sacco and Watson present as archetypical examples in
their theories, for instance the adoption of the Code Napoleon model in
Egypt, and the borrowing of the German civil code, Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch in Japan. In both cases, although the social and historical
contexts are different from the originating systems, strong similarities
emerge in the way the social ruling class within each given context
identified, in the Code, its own main instrument of governance.32 By
undermining the conceptual heart of Sacco’s and Watson’s theories of (the
core) private law’s diffusion, i.e. the law/society split, this critique
represents an important step towards the deconstruction of the
core/periphery of law divide. In fact, Monateri’s argument adds a
comparative law flavour and new insights to the deconstructive efforts put
forth within the unitedstatesean scholarship by the Critical Legal Studies
movement. In the following paragraphs, I will mention just two crucial
critical works that mostly contributed to collapse the market/family,
core/periphery dichotomy. In his seminal work on form and substance of
adjudication in private law, Professor Duncan Kennedy greatly contributes
to the deconstruction of the bipolar structure of the core/periphery
opposition in private law by showing the inconsistency of widespread legal
assumptions like the individualism of contract law and the mere technical
character of its rules.33 In particular, Professor Kennedy demonstrates that
even the law of contracts, i.e. the very core of private law, is crossed by a
tension between two opposite paradigms, individualism and altruism.
Kennedy thus makes the way to disrupting the presumed opposition
between the main patterns underpinning the family and the market.
Professor Frances Olsen, arguing against feminist reform strategies
based on a perception of social life as divided between the two separate
spheres of market and family, demonstrates that the supposed distinction
between the family and the market does not rely on contrasting paradigms
like solidarity versus individualism, or state intervention versus laissezfaire. Rather, both the family and the market systematically affect
solidarity and individualism, state intervention and laissez-faire. As both
domains went across different stages—feudalism, liberalism, and the
32. Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Critica dell’ideologia e Analisi Antagonista:il
Pensiero di Marx e le Strategie della Comparazione, in RIVISTA CRITICA DEL DIRITTO
PRIVATO 703 (2000).
33. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Political Stakes in “Merely Technical” Issues
of Contract Law, 1 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 7, 13 (2001); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1713 (1976).
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welfare state—and evolved along the same path, although their own
developments sometimes parallel but other times follow inverse patterns.
For example, the crucial changes that occurred in family law in the era of
the welfare state, like equality between spouses and acknowledgement of
children’s rights, testify to the evolution of family law from a hierarchical
ideology towards individualism, the same evolution that had concerned the
core of private law during the rise of individualism. By contrast, welfare
state reforms in the market reduced individualism and promoted a new kind
of hierarchy between social groups.34
On these premises, a new understanding of family law and new
perspectives for the second wave of comparative family law have
developed. In this renewed theoretical framework, the implications of
family law’s exceptionalism are furtherly investigated and the critique of
the market/family dichotomy unfolds from Kennedy’s and Olsen’s texts
towards other analytical settings.
In a recent work translated and newly published in Italian, Professor
Janet Halley offers a legal realist view of the marriage system in the United
States and in European countries. This view aims to demonstrate that
marriage and other legal forms for adult-to-adult relationships operate
within a bipolar tension between status and contract. Hence, marriage is
not based on either status or contract per se, but is constantly open both to
status-like and to contract-like interpretations according to the political
intent of public actors (legislators or judges).35 Then in a forthcoming
paper,36 Professor Halley proposes a thorough reconstruction of the
genealogy of American family law, which she portrays as a relatively
recent development in legal science. The exceptionalism of family law
emerges in this picture not only as a primary character of the discipline but
even as the fundamental reason of the construction of family law as a
distinct legal topic. The resulting family/market distinction persists in the
legal order and also in the legal curriculum as a structural element. Halley
argues that the “mystique” generated by this distinction has negatively
affected theory, scholarship, pedagogy, and legal change concerning family
law and should be overcome. Working on the genealogy of family law
exceptionalism from the perspective of the globalization of legal
consciousness, Professor Duncan Kennedy has recently provided a picture
of the nesting of distinct dualities such as family law/patrimonial law,
necessity/arbitrariness (of legal rules), state law/private law,
34. See generally Francis E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1528 (1983).
35. Janet Halley, Note sulla Costruzione del Sistema delle Relazioni di Coppia: un
Saggio di Realismo Giuridico, in RIVISTA CRITICA DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO 515 (2009).
36. Janet Halley, What is Family Law? A Genealogy, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN
(forthcoming 2010).
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international/national, individual/organic whole, liberalism/reaction, etc. in
Friederich Carl von Savigny’s System of the Modern Roman Law.37 From
such a picture, Kennedy finds that family law, as an autonomous and
coherent legal field within private law, is a creation of classical legal
thought, in the genealogy of which Savigny represents a prominent figure.
CLT construes family law as a sanctuary of Romanticism and even of
reaction within a context dominated by individualistic liberalism,
epitomized by the doctrine of free will. Hence, the exceptionalism of
family law is not only set up, but it will also be maintained by the CLT
rationalist successors of Savigny. Still, this family law, especially in
Savigny’s version, is at the core of another genealogy of modern law, the
sociological one, that—just like the legal order of the family in the
System—impinges on the organic side of law and on its reference to a
spontaneous moral order. In this way, it subverts the very idea that family
law is exceptional.
Reasoning from within the European legal context, I myself have
challenged family law exceptionalism under several points of view. In one
of my works on the topic,38 I argued that the tension between individualism
and solidarity underlies both contract law and family law so that it is
possible to deconstruct the opposition between contract-like and status-like
remedies that legal systems alternatively extend to cohabitation
arrangements. This makes possible as well a deconstruction of the
traditional opposition between individualism-oriented (common law) and
solidarity-oriented (civil law) legal traditions. In another work devoted to
the process of family law harmonization in Europe,39 I questioned the
dominant idea according to which the EU should not interfere with national
choices concerning the regime of the family, because that domain is highly
political and the object of member States’ sovereignty, whereas EU
interventions in the law of the market are totally plausible, because they are
politically neutral and merely technical. I tried to show, on the contrary,
that the harmonization of contract law may be a strugglefield between
national sovereignty and European integration as long as sensitive
questions such as the harmonization of the limits to freedom of contract are
concerned.
The critical, legal realist approach to family law proves crucial in
defeating its marginalization. An international network of (mostly young)
37. Kennedy, Savigny, supra note 11, at 811. See generally FRIEDRICH KARL VON
SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW (1867).
38. Maria Rosaria Marella, Il Diritto di Famiglia fra Status e Contratto, in STARE
INSIEME. I REGIMI GIURIDICI DELLA CONVIVENZA TRA STATUS E CONTRATTO 3 (Franco
Grillini & Maria Rosaria Marella eds., 2001).
39. Maria Rosaria Marella, The NON-Subversive Function of European Private
Law: The Case of Harmonization of Family Law, 12 EURO. L.J. 78 (2006).
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family law scholars from all over the world, who regularly gather to stand
Up Against Family Law Exceptionalism (UAFLE) has developed new
possibilities for resisting the exceptional framing of the family and its
law.40 Their efforts led to the disclosure of a still undisclosed centrality of
the regime of the family, whose legal complexity results from the
stratification of different areas of private law, i.e. family law plus contract
law and tort law, and affects and is affected by different legal fields outside
of private law, such as welfare law, taxation law, labor law, immigration
law, and the like.41 Most importantly, this achievement sheds new light on
the role played by the core/periphery dichotomy in different legal systems,
especially in post-colonial systems, and gives rise to new possibilities for
comparative family law.
III. THE GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSION: THE CORE/PERIPHERY OF LAW AND
THE CORE/PERIPHERY OF THE WORLD
In this Part, I compare the core/periphery divide within private law with
the idea of a core and a periphery of the world assumed respectively as the
source and the destination of legal diffusion. In this framework, the WLT
represents the core of the world.42
In this understanding, the globalization of law, as well as the
modernization of non-Western legal systems, has proceeded through the
wholesale transplantation of Western laws, in particular the Western laws
of the market. In the contemporary world, the core of private law, the law
of contract, moves from the WLT, particularly the law of the United States,
the very core of the world, to the periphery of the world.
The question is: how does the diffusion of the core/periphery of law
work in relation to the core/periphery of the world?
I confront this question at two different levels. The first level is the one
of different phases of globalization of legal consciousness and regards the
family as an instrument of government in the formation of the national
identity of post-colonial states. The second level is the so-called
multicultural dimension, affecting most societies in the West.
Multiculturalism is producing a phenomenon of dislocation of the

40. Chantal Thomas, The Economic Family in Global Context: A Case Study of
Migrant Domestic Workers in Egypt, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 987 (2010); see also Family
Law
Exceptionalism—Toronto,
LEGALSCHOLARSHIPBLOG.COM,
http://legalscholarshipblog.com/2007/10/11/family-law-exceptionalism-toronto-2/ (Oct.
11, 2007) (advertising a conference held by legal scholars in opposition to family law
exceptionalism).
41. Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law:
Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism—Introduction
to the Special Issue on Comparative Family Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 761 (2010).
42. See supra note 5.
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peripheral law from the “periphery” to the “core” of the world, which takes
place precisely when European courts enforce non-European legal rules in
deciding family law disputes within their own jurisdictions.
A. Family Law in the Construction of Legal Traditions
It has been pointed out above that CLT construed family law as
exceptional and different from the law of obligations, that is, the periphery
of private law, the core of which is represented by contract law.43 From
this narrative, emerge the ideas that the legal family is politically oriented,
national, and strongly influenced by local traditions, religion, beliefs, and
social values shared in a certain community. In spite of the transformations
that have occurred in legal consciousness over time, this ideological
construction persists in the so-called WLT and beyond.
Several research studies have recently unveiled the mystifying nature of
those narratives, which conceal beneath the veil of localism and
marginality the role that family law plays in the construction of legal
traditions.
Taking Duncan Kennedy’s Three Globalizations as
background,44 a group of UAFLE scholars have explored the way in which
the presumed national character of family law in different geopolitical
contexts has been strategically deployed, as an original product, or set aside
in order to emphasize similarities between the local legal system and a
foreign dominant legal culture.
The classically presumed localism of family law does not explain how
the same modes of legal consciousness have spread out over time, and
throughout the world, from the core to the periphery, and produced legal
change in many fields, including common trends in conceptualizing the
family and its legal regime. Projects of modernization of family law are
embraced in many nation states, almost simultaneously with national
strategies aiming to reinforce the traditional character of the family.45
In fact, the globalization of given rationales concerning family law is
often mediated by the stereotype of its national character, which implies a
concern for State sovereignty every time legal change occurs in the field.
Scholars and institutions committed to the problems of European
integration have struggled with this pattern. However, the transformation
of family law is assisted by different narratives, depending on where it

43. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT
(2006), available at http://duncankennedy.net/legal_history/essays.html#R&F;
Kennedy, Globalizations, supra note 1.
44. Kennedy, Globalizations, supra note 1, at 63-73.
45. See id. at 69-71 (noting how local elites mediated between neo-formalistic
ideologies of sexual and family legal codes and local, traditional ideologies in the third,
post-1945 wave of globalization).
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takes place—whether at the core or in the peripheral corners of the world.
The “modernization” of family law in Europe and the West—at the
core—is presented as the product of an internal political struggle—the
compromise reached within the national parliament by conflicting political
forces or, alternatively, an original issue of that legal tradition—rather than
as the reception of developments occurring at a transnational level.
At the periphery, decolonization processes are frequently interwoven
with the complex dynamics of “modernization.” It was common for
peripheral elites engaged in the modernization of the local legal system to
consider a foreign dominant legal culture “per field.” As a result, a modern
market develops and a parallel system preserves a traditional family within
the same legal system. The preservation of local traditions in family law
represents the “price” for modernizing the law of obligations.
However, the tradition/modernization dialectics may be more complex
than that. An extremely important critical development in this direction is
represented by Professor Lama Abu-Odeh’s seminal article on the
modernization of Muslim family law in Egypt.46 In this article Abu-Odeh
takes into law the analysis developed in Partha Chatterjee’s The Nation and
Its Fragments, which argued that the nationalist Bengali elite split the
world by accepting modernization for western science and the like, but
rejecting it for the family.47 Abu-Odeh shows how nationalist legislation in
modern Egypt had to compromise between modernizing women for
development and keeping them constrained for national cultural autonomy.
She further highlights that Egyptian feminism, pushing for liberal reforms,
meets the male nationalist reforming elite that has to compromise with
conservative religious authorities. This analysis offers basic insights into
the intricacies characterizing modernization/tradition dynamics in
postcolonial contexts.
In former British colonies in Africa such as Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana,
the modernization of the family had been pursued by the colonizer mainly
through the positivization and bureaucratization of law, and the definition
of the legality of the family. Interestingly, post-colonial States, which bear
a responsibility to the international community to pursue the modern
family, continue and sustain the same project.48 According to Yun-Ru
Chen,49 in late nineteenth century Taiwan, which was colonized by Japan,
46. Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1043-46 (2004).
47. PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND
POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES (1993).
48. See S. Wairimu Kang’ara, A Critical Overview of the Creation and
Development of British Colonial Family Law in Africa (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
49. See Yun-Ru Chen, Ally with the West: The Politics of Identity in
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the Taiwanese male elites fought a national identity struggle just on the
terrain of the legal regime of the family. The Japanese justified the
extension to Taiwan of Japanese family law by presenting it as more
modern. This matched the Japanese narrative that Taiwanese traditional
custom was inferior to Japanese modern law. On the other side, the
Taiwanese resisted this assimilation project by opposing the patriarchal
character of some Japanese rules (for example, primogeniture) with the
more “civilized” Taiwanese customs (equality among all sons in
succession) and electing the West as the “true” modern against Japan’s
incomplete westernization and reform. In sum, this is not the story of an
opposition between tradition and modernity; it is the story of a competition
between two different projects of modernizing Taiwanese family law.
In Europe, the Greek case, as analyzed by Philomila Tsoukala,50 is an
interesting example of this phenomenon, with family law playing a crucial
role within the civilization versus barbarism rhetoric, and providing a
primary means by which Greek nationalists could claim that the ethnic
Greeks preserved their “Greekness” through the years of the Ottoman
domination. During the initial phases of the creation of the Greek State, the
emphasis on the law enacted by the Christian Orthodox Church, in
particular the law of marriage, allowed the elites of the time to repel any
possible “barbaric” inheritance from the Ottoman years. This narrative
masked in fact a harsh rivalry between distinct institutions and elites, with
the Orthodox Church competing with the Ottoman kadis on the one hand,
and with local civil authorities, on the other. In this way, the newborn
Greek nation constructed its Western identity. This representation, as
scholars have suggested, combines modernity, civilization, national
identity, and the relationship between the State and the Church as pieces of
a mosaic that could have been put together in many other ways.51
B. The Core/Periphery Divide in Globalized Societies.
The contemporary process of globalization of law (the third
globalization, in Duncan Kennedy’s scheme)52 exhibits a flipping of the
paradigms supporting the family and the market, if compared with the
previous phases of legal globalization. Modernization of family law relies
nowadays on principles deriving from an old legal consciousness. Whereas
today solidarity is considered a principle upon which a fair, modern market
Modernization of Taiwanese Family Law Under the Oriental Empire in Japan (18951945) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
50. Philomila Tsoukala, Marrying Family Law to the Nation, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
873 (2010).
51. Id. at 873.
52. Kennedy, Globalizations, supra note 1, at 63.
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ought to be erected, solidarity was once deemed a major tool in the
construction of the old, hierarchical family.53 The old-fashioned, typical
classical-legal-thought-paradigm of individualism, which enforced free will
and individual rights, represents an updated rationale in family law
modernization. In the framework of globalization, this pattern reproduces
the mutual dialectics between the family and the market that Olsen
described in reference to American law.54 This picture helps us to
understand the dynamics supporting the creation of a global family law in
Western and, particularly, European societies.
Let us go back to our starting point. We have seen that the legal
community generally depicts family law as the periphery of private law
because it is supposed to be inexorably local, intrinsically policy-oriented,
influenced by local traditions, and moulded on particular social needs. In
brief, localism and marginality are its main features. Nevertheless, family
law travels, and its travelling is restricted neither to the
colonial/postcolonial context, nor to the phenomenon of the harmonization
of law in Europe.
In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for instance, Muslims followed the
Islamic family regime; therefore, polygamy and other Muslim institutions
were enforced within the core of the world.55 In today’s globalized
societies, diffusion of family law is sometimes indirectly achieved through
the vehicle of private international law. In this Part, I will focus on a mode
of legal diffusion which basically differs from the phenomena of legal
transplants I have tackled above. In fact, I will address the dynamics
assisting the enforcement of private international law in family law matters,
i.e., a context within which courts operating in domestic jurisdictions test
the compatibility of non-domestic family law with the principles of their
own legal systems in order to adjudicate family law disputes between
foreign citizens. Thus, non-western family law can travel from the
periphery to the core of the world thanks to the machinery of private
international law. Nevertheless, in moving from the periphery to the core
of the world, there are pieces of the peripheral legal package that are left
behind. Here the third globalization scheme helps out.56 I am arguing that
non-westernized law (law from the periphery) can travel to the core as long
as it is compatible with the rhetoric and politics of the core’s human rights
53. Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice in
European Contract Law: A Manifesto, 10 EURO. L.J. 653 (2004).
54. Olsen, supra note 34, at 1497.
55. Irmgard Marboe, Islamic Religious Education in Austria: A Model for
Teaching
and
Learning
Islamic
Law?,
available
at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/events/globalsharia/i_marboe_paper.pdf (last
visited Aug. 17, 2010).
56. Kennedy, Globalizations, supra note 1, at 19-20.
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(that is, with the individualist paradigm). On the contrary, the core rejects
such peripheral law as long as the non-westernized law enforces the
communitarian value of solidarity, evoking a patriarchal (or “noncivilized”) image, as in polygamy. As to the first phenomenon just
described (the core accepting law from the periphery), we have the
tendency of German courts to adjust family law rules originating from third
world countries to German law in order to preserve the original goals and
the resulting balance of interests in favour of third world nationals living in
Germany. In 1996, the German Karlsruhe Court of Appeals enforced the
kafalah, a Muslim legal institution according to which a minor is taken care
of without being adopted—adoption being forbidden by the Sharia. The
court held that kafalah is not contrary to internal—that is, German—public
policy.57 Other European legal systems, such as Spain and Italy, have also
recognized kafalah as enforceable in the domestic jurisdiction.
Specifically, Spain endorsed a kafalah in 1995 in a Granada Court of
Appeals decision,58 and recently Italy’s Court of Cassation recognized
kafalah as a legitimate form of custody over minors for purposes of family
reunification.59
In these examples, the periphery of law originating at the periphery of
the world moved toward the center of the WLT. According to Professor
Erik Jayme, this is not just a case of tolerance: through the enforcement of
the 1989 U.N. Convention on Children’s Rights (Article 20 of which
explicitly mentions kafalah as a form of assistance worthy of being
recognized), the Muslim rule indirectly triggers a legal change within
western legal systems which are now encouraged to make their adoption
regimes more flexible and diverse (such as in Spain and France).60 Still, in
reference to the Muslim law of marital relationships, French courts
interpret repudiation of the spouse as a divorce suit, notwithstanding its
distance from the no-fault divorce of the western egalitarian family, when a
wife accepts the repudiation or a husband assumes an obligation of
financial support.61 However the geometric perfection of the pattern I have
57. See Oberlandesgerict Karlsruhe [OLG] [Appellate Court of Karlsruhe] Nov. 25,
1996, Zeitschrift für Familienrecht [FamRZ] ¶ 6, 10, 1996 (Ger.) (finding in this case
that the child’s living arrangements were more favourable than the German adoption,
and upholding the kafalah living arrangement).
58. A.P. Granada, April 25, 1995 (47 Revista Española de Derecho International,
p. 415) (Spain).
59. Cass., sez. un., 20 marzo 2008, n. 7472, 7 Famiglia e Diritto 674 (2008) (It.).
60. See Erik Jayme, Osservazioni per una Teoria Postmoderna della
Comparazione Giuridica, in RIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE, 813 (1997). An Italian
translation of the paper presented on June 5, 1997 in Osnabrück, is now published in
JAHRESHEFTE DER INTERNATIONALEN VEREINIGUNG OSNABRÜCK (1997/1998); see also
G.A. Res. 44/25, Art.20, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Dec. 12, 1989).
61. See Jayme, supra note 60, at 819.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

21

MARELLA 1/24/11

4/7/2011 2:29:32 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 9

742

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:2

sketched above (the symmetric dynamics of inclusion into/exclusion from
the legal systems at the core of the world) can be broken up by other
considerations. In particular, recent developments in Italian case law on
kafalah show a disagreement within the Supreme Court itself as to the
compatibility of kafalah with the principles of Italian law of custody over
minors. On the one hand the recognition of kafalah, even for limited
purposes of family reunification, is no longer uncontested: in a recent case
the Italian Court of Cassation62 has stated that a kafalah which entitled an
Italian citizen to custody over a minor from Morocco does not entitle to
family reunification for it is not in line with the principles of domestic and
international law of adoption. On the other hand, Professor Jayme’s
hypothesis of a mutual influence and integration between western and nonwestern models of children’s custody through private international law has
not taken place in Italian law at least: a local court63 has recently rejected
the assimilation of a Moroccan kafalah to the Italian “adoption in special
cases”—a kind of open adoption which represents the most flexible form of
adoption in Italian law—arguing that the respective legal effects (according
to Italian law the appellants would have assumed the parenting for the
minor, while the minor would have become Italian citizen in contrast with
Moroccan public policy) are not compatible with one another.
In the background, more general questions arise: to what extent is the
recognition of non-western law within western jurisdictions marked by the
ends western courts want to achieve in relation to the non-western legal
means available? And to what extent is non-western law culturally
transformed through this recognition?64 The complexity of this theme
cannot be addressed in this Article. In principle I believe that such
questions are not distinctive of the core/periphery, west/non-west
encounter, as they draw on a conflict between competing paradigms, which
generally affects legal adjudication in the context I am discussing here as
well as in domestic adjudication or in the context of the harmonization of
law, to which the last part of this Article is devoted.
As to the second tendency mentioned above (the core rejecting
peripheral law which enforces the solidarity paradigm), again the system of
private international law plays a role. In fact, the enforcement of private
international law by European courts generally involves a public policy
test, which may counter the recognition of non-westernized foreign

62. Cass., sez. Un., 1 marzo 2010, n. 4868, 8-9 Famiglia e Diritto 780 (2010) (It.).
63. Trib. per i minorenni di Brescia, sentenza 12 marzo 2010, 3 RIVISTA DI

DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 760 (2010).
64. Pascale Fournier, Flirting with God in Western Secular Courts: Mahr in the
West, 24 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 67 (2010).
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marriages.65 Traditionally, public policy arguments have aimed to protect
monogamy and genuine consent to marry; therefore, recognition has
constantly been denied to polygamous and bigamous marriages, as well as
to forced and arranged marriages. At a different level, namely at the
transnational level of E.U. law, the recent E.U. Directive on Family
Reunification, approved on September 22, 2003,66 reproduces the same
pattern that has traditionally characterized the enforcement of private
international law rules by European courts in reference to the validity of
marriage; the Directive does not refrain from imposing the conventional
notion of the nuclear family on the citizens of developing nations who
engaged in polygamy. The Directive’s rationale (seeming to draw on a
CLT individualistic paradigm) requires nations to reject any family law
institution not in line with the “modern” family. Here, polygamy is the
occasion for Europe, the original core of the WLT, to push back to the
periphery of the world its law. However, the challenge that polygamy
issues to the law of the West is much more complex than that. In some
western countries, such as Canada and the United States, for instance, there
are communities of nationals (that is, respectively, Canadian and U.S.
citizens) that commonly engage in polygamous marriages.67 Here the
threat to the modern family does not come from outside—from the
periphery of the world—but from inside. And, although the prevalent
perception of these habits is one of extraneity, of exotism, in respect to the
identity of the Nation, the defence of monogamy as the epitome of the
modern family relies on national criminal law banning polygamy and
bigamy rather than on private international law.68
65. Mark Bell, Holding Back the Tide? Cross-Border Recognition of Same-Sex
Partnerships Within the European Union, 5 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 613 (2004); Richard
Frimston, Marriage and Non-Marital Registered Partnerships: A European
Perspective
of
Private
International
Law,
available
at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/doc (last visited Dec. 4, 2010). With
specific reference to the operation of the public policy principle in this field, see Alex
Mills, The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law, 4 J. PRIV. INT.’L
L. 201 (2008); Haris P. Meidanis, Public Policy and Ordre Public in the Private
International Law of the EC/EU: Traditional Positions of the Member States and
Modern Trends, 30 E. L. REV. 95 (2005).
66. See Council Directive 2003/86, On the Right to Family Reunification, 2001
O.J. (L 251) 12, 15 (EC) (not authorizing Member States to allow family reunification
(immigration) of an additional spouse where the sponsoring individual already lives
with a spouse in the territory of a Member State).
67. Angela Campbell, Bountiful’s Plural Marriages, INT’L J.L. IN CONTEXT (2010)
(forthcoming),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1671611;
Angela
Campbell,
Bountiful Voices, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 183-234 (2009); Martha M. Ertman, Race
Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
287 (2010).
68. The criminalization of polygamy does not just involve marriage, it involves
living in a conjugal union with more than one person. Now, those people who live in a
polyamorous ménage are also polygamists in the eyes of the law. Brenda Cossman,
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To sum up, the fate of the periphery of law is not to remain local both at
the periphery and the center of the world. We have evidence of a trend that
may reproduce the pattern that Olsen highlights with respect to the relation
core/periphery of law in the developing American law.69 The principles of
western family law may diffuse to the periphery, although more slowly70
than the core of private law, namely the law of contracts, does. Even when
modernization of family law is not on the agenda of post-colonial states,
and even where it has been totally rejected, the rhetoric of human rights
that supports (and is increasingly reinforced by) the emerging
individualism of westernized family laws might play a role. Human rights
are central in contemporary legal consciousness, representing a kind of
universal legal linguistic units.71 As such, they tend to be projected in a
transnational dimension. Values like women’s and children’s rights are
likely to diffuse (and/or be imposed by international institutions like the
U.N.) all over the world at the expenses of the hierarchical family, which
may resist in the periphery as an option in favour of Tradition and national
identity. This way, the implementation of human rights becomes a
powerful instrument for the diffusion of western values in family law
beyond the West. In fact, all the major human rights treaties require the
adoption of western-style modes of relations between parents and children
and husbands and wives, and, in so doing, they turn into a global force for
the harmonization of family law.72 Therefore their influence might produce
Polygamy,
UNIVERSITY
OF
TORONTO
(Sept.
25,
2009)
http://www.uc.utoronto.ca/content/view/775/2666. In this light the last challenge of
polygamy does not issue from the “old fashioned” paradigm and does not threaten
modernity, the way it is epitomized by the monogamous and nuclear family; on the
contrary, it comes from the very core of (post)modern western societies and stands up
against the modern family, which is seen as the sanctuary of Sex’s normalization. See
BRENDA COSSMAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS, THE LEGAL AND CULTURAL REGULATION OF SEX
AND BELONGING (2007); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory
Monogamy and PolyamorousExistence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 340–
54 (2004).
69. See Olsen, supra note 34, at 1497.
70. See Abu-Odeh, supra note 46, at 1043. According to Abu-Odeh, in reforming
its family law, Tunisia definitely received the ideas of individualism and companionate
marriage.
71. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 66.
72. The International Community has always devoted a great deal of attention to
the protection of human rights within the family. This effort has resulted in several
major international instruments focused on family law issues: the United Nations
Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed
Conflict, G.A. Res. 3318 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/9631,
at 146 (Dec. 14, 1974); Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Labour
Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 156 Concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal
Treatment for Men and Women Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities, June
23, 1981, 1331 U.N.T.S. 295; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S.
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a phenomenon of gradual legal change of peripheral law at the periphery.
Finally an extraordinary factor of uniformization of the socio-economic
role the family plays at the core and at the periphery is to be identified in
the neoliberal economic policy which the international financial institutions
are imposing on nations all over the world. Both at the core and at the
periphery, the institutions of globalization are paying a so far unknown
attention to “sex, sexuality, gender, reproduction, and the family as central
to the making of the global legal order and, indeed, of the global political
319.
In particular, the United Nations and the Hague Conference on Private
International Law created a movement to harmonize some aspects of family law across
national regimes and to avoid the harmful human consequences of conflicts of law in
this area. See United Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for
Marriage and Registration of Marriages, Dec. 10, 1962, 521 U.N.T.S. 231; see also
Hague Convention Relating to the Settlement of the Conflict of the Laws Concerning
Marriage, June 12, 1902, Hague A; Hague Convention Relating to the Settlement of the
Conflict of Laws and Jurisdictions as Regards Divorce and Separation, June 12, 1902,
Hague B; Hague Convention Relating to Conflicts of Laws with Regard to the Effects
of Marriage on the Rights and Duties of the Spouses in Their Personal Relationship and
with Regard to Their Estates, July 17, 1905, Hague E; Hague Convention on the
Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, June 1, 1970, Hague 18; Hague
Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes, March 14, 1978,
Hague 25, available at www.hcch.net.
As to family maintenance and support, see Hague Convention Concerning the
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations
Towards Children, April 15, 1958, Hague 9; Hague Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations, October 2, 1973,
Hague 23; Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations,
October 2, 1973, Hague 24, available at www.hcch.net.
As to child custody and abduction, the main international conventions are:
Hague Convention Relating to the Settlement of Guardianship of Minors, June 12,
1902, Hague C; Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, October 25, 1980, Hague 28; Hague Convention on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, October 19, 1996, Hague
34, available at www.hcch.net.
As to the issue of inter-country adoption, see Declaration on Social and Legal
Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference
to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally, G.A. Res. 41/85,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85 (Dec. 3, 1986); Council of Europe, European Convention on
the Adoption of Children, April 24, 1967, C.E.T.S. No. 58. See also Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to
Adoptions, Nov. 15, 1965, Hague 13; Hague Convention on Protection of Children and
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, Hague 33, available
at www.hcch.net.
The most important international instruments concerning the rights of the child
are: Declaration on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354, at 19 (Nov. 20, 1959); United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of Children, Child Prostitution and
Child Pornography, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227; Council of Europe, European
Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights, Jan. 25, 1996, C.E.T.S. No. 160. See
also Hague Convention Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable
in Respect of the Protection of Minors, Oct. 5, 1961, Hague 10, available at
www.hcch.net.
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economy.”73 Households as sites of social production are finally
recognized in global projects as contiguous to the market, for they supply
human reproduction, welfare provisions and consumption. In spite of
family law exceptionalism, this is actually nothing new, rather a constant in
the family/market relationship from the rise of capitalism. Nevertheless
this makes today necessary to provide a critical analysis of family law
within globalized societies that enables us to explore the way in which the
market and the family are moving along together.
As a matter of fact, the World Bank, whose influential role in the
developing world is undeniable although censurable, has recently decided
to functionalize the family to market purposes.74 The family is of interest
because it impinges on whether and how its members participate in
markets. In turn policies aiming at increasing the level of labor market
participation affect the structure and the functioning of the family.
Initiatives on gender equality draw on the acknowledgement that the
distribution of resources within the household is a function of the
bargaining power held by different family members, which in turn is
influenced by the economic opportunities each of them holds outside of the
household. A greater participation by women in the market is supposed to
change the gendered division of household labor to women’s benefit. At
the same time a major concern in the World Bank’s agenda are those laws
(statutory or customary) which grant “unequal rights between husbands and
wives in respect of marriage, divorce, reproductive decisions, child
custody, marital property, and inheritance.”75
More generally, human rights politics, affecting—as we have seen
above—family relations, are deemed as factors of economic growth as long
as they promote social inclusion.
Nevertheless the World Bank’s project cannot succeed as long as it fails
to address most of the problems that are systemically reported as structural
elements in the labor markets all over the world: i.e. lower income and
worse market opportunities for women. Very similar patterns are to be
noticed today in industrialized countries at the core of the world where
neoliberal economic policies are disempowering distinct social groups—
women above all—both in the market and within the family, as increasing
flexibility and precariousness in the labor market, on the one hand, and the
retreat of welfare state from elderly and children care, on the other, all

73. Halley & Rittich, supra note 41, at 755.
74. WORLD BANK, ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT: THROUGH RIGHTS, RESOURCES

AND VOICE (2003). For an analysis see Kerry Rittich, Black Sites: Locating the Family
and Family Law in Development, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1023 (2010).
75. Rittich, supra note 74, at 1038.
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contribute to expropriate social production from those who make it.76
III. THE METHODOLOGICAL DIMENSION: THE HARMONIZATION PROCESS,
FROM LEGAL DIFFUSION TO UNIFORM LAW
European countries are now facing the challenge of harmonization of
law. In a harmonization framework, legal diffusion is no longer an
occasional and fragmented experience. On the contrary, the science of
legal borrowings, comparative law, is now used in constructing a uniform
law for the European Union. In the field of private law, different
techniques are being used to achieve this goal, including harmonization and
competition among legal systems, as well as the finding of common
principles for the creation of uniform legal regimes.77 The core/periphery
divide in private law, which has been a central preoccupation in this article,
has profoundly affected the harmonization process. In this respect, the aim
of the present part is threefold: firstly, I assume the harmonizing process, as
the case for showing that the same comparative law method, can be
embraced both at the core and at the periphery of the law; secondly, this
comparative approach, relying on legal formants, will make it possible to
identify the distributive outcomes of a certain legal regime, because it
uncovers the law in action and the ways in which it reallocates material
resources; and thirdly, the methodology of comparative law, by means of
the theory of cryptotypes, will prove useful to reveal the cultural genealogy
of legal rules, by unveiling the multiple layers which are in the background
of legal principles and produce potential tensions and contradictions within
a given legal system.
As to the harmonization of the core of law, the prevailing methodology
still relies upon continuity, the search for spontaneously converging rules,
and the finding of a common core. In the words of Hein Kötz, one of the
most prominent advocates of the harmonization process in Europe,
“National legal systems need to be treated as mere local variations of a
European theme, which is in principle unitary.”78 When uniformity is
pursued (such as the Principles of European Contract Law formulated by
the Lando Commission),79 the project requires the selection of existing
76. ANTONIO NEGRI & MICHAEL HARDT, COMMONWEALTH (2009).
77. See Marella, supra note 39, at 90-91.
78. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE

LAW 29 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1996). See generally James
Gordley, Comparative Law and Legal History, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 753 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2007).
79. COMM’N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONTRACT
LAW
(1998),
available
at
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_
contract_law/Skabelon/pecl_engelsk.htm.
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legal rules and may even imply the creation of new legal rules according to
an ideal of internal rationality, coherence, and harmony of the system.
Typically, harmonizing action to develop a common European market is
uncontroversial, while harmonizing action in family law is decried as
impossible. Even if recognized as feasible, proposals for the harmonization
of family law80 are ruled by another approach. The same factors that make
family law the periphery of private law counter the very idea of
harmonizing family law: the influence of religious factors and local
traditions, and the dependence on political choices make family law
inherently and inexorably national.81
Paradoxically, the same
commonplaces have played a major role in producing the most effective
harmonization project. Unlike many projects concerning the harmonization
of the core, the harmonization of family law is pursued according to a
striking functionalist inspiration. The prevailing methodology is the socalled “better law” approach. Given a certain legal problem, for instance
the division of marital property at divorce, the “better law” approach
requires finding the most progressive rule among all the Member States.
Here the basic idea is that some European legal systems show a more
progressive attitude in regulating family law topics than others do. Thus,
the harmonization of family law proceeds through discontinuity,82
although the “better law” model is usually presented as non-antagonistic to
the common core idea, since progressive legislators are supposed to be
capable of anticipating policy tendencies that conservative legal systems
will later follow, thus starting an irresistible process of convergence. While
the creation of a European (core) private law pursues an ideal of rationality
that is inside the law, the making of European family law aims at fulfilling
values that are overtly outside the law.
But is the more progressive rule actually that easy to identify? As a
80. The harmonization of Family Law in Europe is the aim of The Commission on
European Family Law (CEFL), which was established in 2001. This network of jurists
published, in 2004, the Principles Regarding Divorce and Maintenance Between
Former Spouses, K. BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW
REGARDING DIVORCE AND MAINTENANCE BETWEEN FORMER SPOUSES (2004), and, in
2007, the Principles Regarding Parental Responsibilities. K. BOELE-WOELKI ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW REGARDING PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES
(2007)). The Principles on matrimonial property law are to be expected in 2010. For
an overview see Katharina Boele-Woelki & Dieter Martiny, The Commission on
European Family Law (CEFL) and its Principles of European Family Law Regarding
Parental Responsibilities, 8 ERA FORUM 125-43 (2007). For a historical account see
MASHA ANTOKOLSKAIA, HARMONISATION OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE: A TALE OF TWO MILLENNIA (2006).
81. David Bradley, A Family Law for Europe? Sovereignty, Political Economy and
Legitimation, in 4 PERSPECTIVES FOR THE UNIFICATION AND HARMONISATION OF
FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 65, 73 (Katharina Boele-Woelki ed., 2003). For a discussion,
see Marella, supra note 39, at 78; Tsoukala, supra note 50, at 873.
82. See supra Chart 2.
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matter of fact, the political instances at stake are not likely to produce a
coherent and progressive body of rules. Any single European national
family law shows progressive developments but also unexpected
regressions. Therefore, it is naïve to believe that the “better law” can be
selected among a number of alternatives by focusing on the apparently
most progressive legal system (very often identified with Scandinavian
countries).
For example, the emancipation of women and the subsequent recasting
of family legal regimes around the paradigm of spousal equality are central
to the progressive project in family law. But these goals can be and
actually are achieved through different strategies, sometimes through
formal equality and other times through substantive equality. For instance,
Swedish family law, assumed by the harmonizers to be the progressive
legislation par excellence, sometimes aims to enhance women’s equality
within the family by adopting a formal equality strategy (e.g. Sweden’s
1970s divorce reform with a sharp reduction of financial support to
wives)83 and sometimes by endorsing a substantive equality strategy (the
Cohabitees (Joint) Homes Act of 1987 automatically extending marital
obligations and entitlements on marital property to unmarried couples
involved in a stable union or raising children).84 In accordance with a
formal equality paradigm, the German civil code recognizes freedom of
contract between spouses and the enforceability of support waivers in
contemplation of divorce.85 By contrast, Italian law holds prenuptial
agreements void in the light of a substantive equality strategy.86 Which
strategy is the most progressive? Which represents the “better law?” The
so-called “difference dilemma,” which dominated the feminist debate for
years, proves the frustration and weariness involved in such a choice.87
As a matter of fact, the progressive character of a certain family legal
regime should be detected through an attentive analysis of the distributive
consequences associated to the legal rules, but both the better law and the
common core approach fail to consider this. Is the periphery of law
destined to be governed by this simplistic version of functionalism? Isn’t it
the time to get rid of Family Law Exceptionalism in comparative law
83. See Bradley, supra note 81, at 65.
84. 1 § LAG OM SAMBORS GEMENSAMMA HEM (Svensk författningssamling [SFS]

1987:232, 1987:814) (Swed.).
85. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 78, at 152.
86. See Maria Rosaria Marella, The Old and the New Limits to Freedom of
Contract in Europe, 2 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 257, 263-64 (2006) [hereinafter Old and
New]. See generally GLENDON, supra note 25, at 89-97 (discussing German marriage
and divorce law over time).
87. See Brenda Cossman, A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender
Equality, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 303, 309-14 (1990). See generally MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990).
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methodology? As I have shown in Parts I and II of this Article, more
sophisticated approaches have already been successfully deployed in the
comparative analysis of family law issues. It is time to import them into
the debates about family law harmonization.
In my own view, the harmonization of both the core and the periphery of
private law, as well as the currently dominant approaches in the
harmonization process—the common core approach and the “better law”
approach—should be submitted to the deconstructive scrutiny of
comparative law as both a method of analysis of legal diffusion and a
powerful instrument of internal critique. This change of perspective, which
leads to recognize the operational rules through the formants analysis, will
make possible a distributive analysis of family law aimed at identifying the
real impact a legal rule has on the bargaining power of different social
groups.
First, the theory of legal formants should be taken into account in
understanding and mastering the dynamics of legal diffusion and legal
change within Europe in the light of the harmonization enterprise. The
theory of legal formants triggers the so called “dynamic approach” to
comparative law by focusing on law as a social activity. According to this
view, a legal formant is represented by a group or a community whose
institutional task is to create law. In every legal system, there are at least
three legal actors involved in the activity of creating law: judges,
legislators, and legal theorists. These subjects all produce different kinds
of rules enshrined in different texts, such as, opinions, holdings, statutes,
articles, and so on.
The resulting picture is that in a given legal system we find many
different elements such as statutory rules, the formulations of scholars, the
decisions of judges, the praxis of legal professionals and the like: these
components of a legal system are defined as “legal formants.” Since the
rules produced by one formant can contrast those produced by another
formant, “[w]ithin a given legal system with multiple “legal formants”
there is no guarantee that they will be in harmony rather than in conflict.”88
This formants dissonance has to be highlighted by a method aimed at
uncovering, separating and explaining the materials used to create the
various texts. The ultimate achievement of this approach is to “substitute
the model of the law as a more or less consistent system of interrelated,
hierarchically connected propositions, by a model of competing formants
within the unique setting and constraints of one legal tradition.”89 Viewed
in this light, the harmonization of the core of private law is not flawless
88. Sacco, Installment I, supra note 12, at 23.
89. Pier Giuseppe Monateri & Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants, in THE PALGRAVE

DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW II 531 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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either: the focus on convergence among legal systems is based on a sharp
distinction between what the rule is and what the exception is within a legal
system. For example, according to Article 1321 of the Italian Civil Code, a
contract is an agreement, that is, it consists of two wills (rule). On the
contrary, Article 1333 states that, in certain cases, a contract can be formed
even when the offeree remains silent, that is, without an agreement
(exception).90 But the theory of legal formants denies the legitimacy of this
hierarchy, because any formant within a legal system is likely to produce
its own rule and its own exceptions with reference to the same legal matter.
If one looks at the previous example using the theory of legal formants, it
becomes clear that the Article 1333 doesn’t state an exception to the
agreement rule. In fact, unilateral contracts (Art. 1333) were in the past
marginalized by some legal scholars emphasizing the essential requirement
of bilateral consent, whereas the courts have always enforced unilateral
contracts, recognizing as dominant (and general) the doctrinal ground of
their validity: the consent of the promissor (“the party who is obliged” in
the words of Article 1108 of the Code Napoleon) rather than bilateral
consent.
The supposed political character of family law does not prevent it from
being dealt within the same way. As to the choice of the “better law” with
reference to the enforceability of spousal agreements in contemplation of
divorce, for instance, the seemingly vast difference between German and
Italian law fades into insignificance because it does not consider the
plurality of formants within each legal system. Notwithstanding the black
letter rule of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, the German Federal
Constitutional Court holds prenuptial agreements void, insofar as freedom
of contract is denied by the inequality of the socioeconomic conditions of
the parties.91 Meanwhile, Italian courts are aware that an agreement in
contemplation of divorce does not necessarily make the weaker spouse
worse off and so they deem such an agreement null or void only when it
does harm the disadvantaged party.92 Legal formants are often dissonant to
one another as they introduce contrasting paradigms—here formal versus
substantive equality—in relation to the same provision within the same
legal system. As long as the “better law” approach proceeds without taking
these multiple contingencies into account, it is not able to produce any
90. See Sacco, Installment I, supra note 12, at 32.
91. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 29,

2001, 92 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDEDSVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 1766 (¶
3), 2001 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Feb. 6, 2001, 92 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDEDSVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE]
12 (¶ 18-21), 2001 (Ger.).
92. Maria Rosaria Marella, The Family Economy Versus the Labour Market (or
Housework as a Legal Issue), in LABOUR LAW, WORK, AND FAMILY 161-62 (Joanne
Conaghan & Kerry Rittich eds., 2005).
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useful outcome for the harmonization of law and runs immense risks of
unintended consequences. The example of the equality strategy in the
European Union family law harmonization shows that the option for a
given national solution, the German black letter rule for instance,
disregards the simple fact that the rule effectively enforced in the
originating system does not match the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch provision,
hypothetically selected as the better law.93
Second, the hypothesis of formant dissonance can present the chance for
an internal critique of family legal rules. Let’s examine the case of
abortion law. The Italian legal regime, as represented by the legislature’s
intent, aims at reaching a fair balance between the protection of women’s
health and the interest of the State in protecting human life. The black
letter rule does not mention the principle requiring respect for women’s
self-determination among the interests enforced by the law on abortion.94
But, in the practice of Italian public hospitals, the principle of women’s
self-determination has constantly been enforced in the same terms as in Roe
v. Wade,95 although it is highly unlikely that this outcome is the product of
a legal transplant, namely the borrowing of the privacy principle enforced
by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions. To be sure, this variance in the
enforcement of Italian abortion law is currently under violent attack by
conservative forces, who see it as the betrayal of legislature’s original
intent. However, if we adopt the language of legal science, namely the
language of the comparative analysis of the core of the law even in such a
matter we are ready to understand the case as an ordinary episode of
formants’ dissonance and to consider the coexistence of the two conflicting
considerations absolutely tolerable and even normal. All the examples just
provided clearly demonstrate that if we don’t take legal formants into
account, we will focus on the law in the books and entirely miss the law in
action. This will in turn make us act like formalists, and ignore the
distributive outcomes of a certain legal regime.
The theory of cryptotypes is a significant means of internal critique as
well. It makes it possible to reveal ruptures and conflicts in the genealogy
of a given legal regime and, more generally, to understand modern legal
models or ideas as constituted by the confluence, the combination and the

93. Marella, Old and New, supra note 86, at 264 (noting a decision of the German
Federal Constitutional Court to abrogate a contract as unconstitutional because of the
unfair bargaining power between the lender and lendee despite the provision
guaranteeing the fundamental freedom to contract within the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch).
94. See GLENDON, supra note 25, at 3 n.2.
95. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (basing the right to an abortion on the fundamental
right of privacy but qualifying that right through consideration of “important state
interests”).
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mutual transformation of a variety of earlier ideas.96 Both the coexistence
of a plurality of formants and the operation of cryptotypes shed light on the
stratification a legal system consists of. Law reforms and legal transplants
are implanted in a terrain that is the complex product of a progressing
sedimentation of different elements with distinctive origins and
inspirations. This is true to the same degree for both the core and the
periphery of private law. The contingent political motives underpinning
legal change might or might not be defeated by other elements prevailing in
a particular context. In family law, the legal change promoted everywhere
by emerging individualist (progressive) motives is at some points in
relation to some legal topics neutralized or diminished by the persistence of
a patriarchal paradigm in the form of a cryptotype enacting the previous
regime.
In Italian law, this phenomenon operates, for instance, in reference to
succession law and specifically with respect to agreements concerning
future inheritances.97 The Civil Code provision (Art. 458) holds these
agreements as void. Normally Italian courts implement instead the “post
mortem act” doctrine that acknowledges the validity of such agreements
under certain circumstances, and treats them as enforceable. In doing so,
courts make some exceptions, which have apparently no sound doctrinal
basis, and return to the enforcement of the black letter rule. Such an
exception comes into view, for instance, when a mother seeks to transfer to
her future heirs any family asset through a hereditary agreement. This case
law may be explained on the basis of the theory of cryptotypes. In fact the
previous Italian regime of the family excluded the widow from the
ownership of the husband’s inheritance assets: by annulling the mother’s
transfer Italian courts prove to be under the influence of the old rule.
In France, motherhood, as a legal status, had been determined until the
1970s by a legitimate marriage rather than from a biological birth.98 As a
matter of fact, legal fictions informed the legal regime of motherhood until
World War I, when the interest of the French state to increase birth rates
prevailed. Then new statutes were passed that aimed to ameliorate the
legal conditions of illegitimate children and unmarried mothers. From this
moment on marriage as the legal fiction housing parentage and the
biological fact of parenthood through sexual intercourse alone were
96. For the concept of “Legal Genealogy” see Kennedy, Savigny, supra note 11, at

831.

97. Maria Rosaria Marella, Il Divieto dei Patti Successori e le Alternative
Convenzionali al Testamento, II, GIURISPRUDENZA SISTEMATICA DI DIRITTO CIVILE E
COMMERCIALE fondata da Walter Bigiavi, I CONTRATTI IN GENERALE, Appendice di
Aggiornamento 1991-1998, 1707-28 (G. Alpa & M. Bessone eds., 1999).
98. See MARCELA IACUB, L’EMPIRE DU VENTRE: POUR UNE AUTRE HISTOIRE DE LA
MATERNITE 15 (2004).
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engaged in a war at the end of which biology became the dominant
paradigm of parental status both outside and inside of marriage. According
to the legal historian Marcela Iacub, with the new law enacted in 1972 the
womb becomes a legal institution and takes the place of marriage.99
Notwithstanding this, the old rationale returns in the regulation of adoption.
Here, a legal fiction makes it possible for the adoptive child to be born
again in his/her new legitimate family, denying his/her biological
origins.100 Thus the primacy of biology is defeated once again, although in
a restricted area of the law of filiation, and another legal fiction of the kind
meant in the 70’s as the legacy of outdated ideas on legal status in family
law is deployed to fulfil new ideas about parenthood as a social and legal
relation valuable beyond biological bonds.
Controversial and unstable relationships between biology and legal
fiction in the legal regimes of parenthood as well as patriarchal pop-ups in
the regime of the egalitarian family prove a persisting tension between old
and new motives, between communitarian and individualist paradigms,
within the law of family relations in Europe. The idea of discontinuity as
the blueprint of legal change in family law is definitely defeated by this
evidence.
In respect to both the core and the periphery of law, the goal of a critical
approach, which the comparative analysis embraces, is not to overcome
these tensions, rather to sustain and highlight the contradictions they
produce.101 If our aim is to address the real progressive character of legal
change, the right way to pursue it is to move within the methodological
perspective I have illustrated so far, always sustained by an appropriate
distributional analysis. Only through this praxis can new fairer distributive
equilibriums among social groups, in the marketplace as well as in the
family, be achieved.
99. Loi 72-3 du 3 janvier 1972 sur la filiation [Law 72-3 of January 3, 1972 on
Filiation], available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
100. The adoption provisions in the French law are codified in part VIII of the Civil
Code, entitled “Of Adoption” (Articles 343 to 370-5, last amended by Act n° 2002-304
of 4th March, 2002 and by Act n° 2003-516 of 18th June, 2003). There are two forms
of adoption under the French law: plenary adoption (“adoption plénière,” Articles 343–
59) and ordinary adoption (“adoption simple,” articles 360 to 370-2). The text refers to
the plenary adoption, which terminates the relationship between birth parent and child
(see Article 356: “Adoption confers on the child a parentage which substitutes for his
original parentage: the adoptee ceases to belong to his blood family . . .”). Thus, all
rights and status which the child may have had from the birth family are revoked and
replaced with the rights and status granted by the adopting family (see Article 357,
which states that the adoptive child bears the family name of his adoptive parents). On
the contrary, according to the ordinary adoption, the adopted child becomes a member
of his new family, but he keeps some legal bonds with his original family (e.g. the
name of the adoptive parents is added to the adoptee’s original name—Article 363; the
adoptee preserves inheritance rights within his original family—Article 364).
101. Kennedy, Savigny, supra note 11, at 811.
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